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Major operations at La Trinidad, Rama highway, and Siuna and La Bonanza. Numerous government bases overrun throughout Jinotega, Matagalpa, Zelaya Norte, Zelaya Sur, Chontales, and Rio San Juan provinces. These actions were frequently carried out systematically as a part of the strategy of the Contras. Some rebels disliked being called contras, feeling that it defined their cause only in negative terms, or implied a desire to restore the old order. Anti-Sandinista Guerrilla Special Forces, and the National Army of Liberation.
Initially however, these groups were small and conducted little active raiding into Nicaragua. Sandinista veterans from the northern mountains. Nicaraguans who had avoided direct involvement in the revolution but opposed the Sandinistas. UDN against working with the Guardsmen and that the merging only took place because of insistence by the CIA. FDN commenced to draw in other smaller insurgent forces in the north. Largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized by the U. A popular and charismatic leader, Pastora initially saw his group develop quickly.
In the course of this conflict, forced removal of at least 10,000 Indians to relocation centers in the interior of the country and subsequent burning of some villages took place. FDN, and the rest accommodating themselves with the Sandinistas: On 8 December 1984 a ceasefire agreement known as the Bogota Accord was signed by Misurasata and the Nicaraguan government. A subsequent autonomy statute in September 1987 largely defused Miskito resistance. Nicaragua claimed that the contras were altogether a creation of the U.
However, the evidence of a very close relationship between the contras and the United States was considered overwhelming and incontrovertible. The US government viewed the leftist Sandinistas as a threat to economic interests of American corporations in Nicaragua and to national security. In spite of the Sandinista victory being declared fair, the United States continued to oppose the left-wing Nicaraguan government. Cuba and the Soviet Union. 19 million in military aid. By December 1981, however, the United States had already begun to support armed opponents of the Sandinista government.
From the beginning, the CIA was in charge. In the fiscal year 1984, the U. 24 million in contra aid. At this time, it only outlawed U. In October 1984, it was amended to forbid action by not only the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency but all U.
Nevertheless, the case for support of the contras continued to be made in Washington, D. Nicaragua to “deal with that threat”. Nicaragua back into a Central American mode” and “turn Nicaragua back toward democracy,” and with the “Latin American democracies” “demand reasonable conduct by regional standard. Soon after the embargo was established, Managua re-declared “a policy of nonalignment” and sought the aid of Western Europe, who were opposed to U. Western credit to and trade with Nicaragua, forcing the government to rely almost totally on the Eastern bloc for credit, other aid, and trade by 1985. In his 1997 study on U.
Johnson, a former Chief of the U. Army Chaplains, contends that U. It was alarming that in just a few months after the Sandinista revolution, Nicaragua received international acclaim for its rapid progress in the fields of literacy and health. It was alarming that a socialist-mixed-economy state could do in a few short months what the Somoza dynasty, a U. It was truly alarming that the Sandinistas were intent on providing the very services that establish a government’s political and moral legitimacy. The government’s program included increased wages, subsidized food prices, and expanded health, welfare, and education services. And though it nationalized Somoza’s former properties, it preserved a private sector that accounted for between 50 and 60 percent of GDP.
The United States began to support Contra activities against the Sandinista government by December 1981, with the CIA at the forefront of operations. The CIA supplied the funds and the equipment, coordinated training programs, and provided intelligence and target lists. While the Contras had little military successes, they did prove adept at carrying out CIA guerrilla warfare strategies from training manuals which advised them to incite mob violence, “neutralize” civilian leaders and government officials and attack “soft targets” — including schools, health clinics and cooperatives. The agency added to the Contras’ sabotage efforts by blowing up refineries and pipelines, and mining ports. Finally, according to former Contra leader Edgar Chamorro, CIA trainers also gave Contra soldiers large knives. A commando knife , and our people, everybody wanted to have a knife like that, to kill people, to cut their throats”. The victim dug his own grave, scooping the dirt out with his hands He crossed himself.